

## POLS 562 SEMINAR ON LEGISLATURES AND PUBLIC POLICY

FALL 2009

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Seminar: 6-8:30 Tu

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The purpose of POLS 562 is to introduce graduate students to the literature on legislative policy making and to encourage them to use it to understand legislating in other legislative settings—American states and local governments and other countries. Sixty-plus years of research by a number of very talented scholars has generated insights into the factors in legislative policy making that may impact that substance of American public laws. Research on other legislatures has asked whether U.S. like processes effect policy in other legislative settings. Such research has also generated new understandings of Congress and legislative policy making in general. The study of legislative policy making is thus a cumulative and increasingly general body of theory and research to which I hope this seminar can contribute.

POLS 562 will focus on several of the major theoretical approaches, the research on Congress and other legislatures that has followed from these approaches, and what we currently know about the limits and promise of these ideas. Much of the relevant literature assumes that the motives of legislators, and particularly their concern with continuing to be legislators, may explain legislative behavior, the structuring of legislative institutions, and the content of statutory law. This insight is David Mayhews in *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (1974) and has been built upon by R. Douglas Arnold, Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina, and others in a variety of studies. It is the foundation of distributive theory, party government, and other theories of legislative policy making. So that is where we will start reading. From so-called electoral control theories we will go to distributive, party-centered, universalism, information centered, pivotal voting, and proposal power theories. For each theory we will read studies of American congressional and state legislatures, local legislatures, and non-American national legislatures.

What will you do in POLS 562? First, you will read and try to understand the various studies. Each of the things you read will review and comment on other research. Since we cannot read all of the literature you should make use of these secondary summaries by making a list of the studies that appear to be the jumping off points for the assigned authors. Second, you will write a short 1 to 3 page critique of the weeks reading and turn it in before class (email it to me at [barryr@uic.edu](mailto:barryr@uic.edu) by noon on Tuesday). Third, you will be asked to report on and lead the discussion of some of the studies we read. Everybody will be required to do this two or three times. Fourth, you will identify a research question and design a study of it. Research questions may be of two general types. You may want to tackle a question or hypothesis about legislative policy making treated in one of the readings—e.g., (even) a question about Congress. Or you can address a question about legislating in a setting other than Congress—state, local, national, international. The idea here may also be to explore which of our

various ideas explain why policy produced by these legislatures takes the form it does—and why. For example, does distributive, informational, proposal power, or universalism (say) provide a better explanation of policy making in your legislature? You might also focus on the politics of legislating a particular type of policy.

Finally, there will be a midterm to test your grasp of the readings. There probably will not be a final exam. The term paper will count for 40 percent of your grade; the midterm 40%; and the presentations, 20%. Extra credit is possible.

Readings will be available in different forms. In no case will you be required to read something that is not available. If and when this happens we may copy the reading and give it to you—as Zach and I have done tonight.

#### TENTATIVE SCHEDULE

Week 1. August 25. Introductions. Read Gramm and Huber article , pp. 313-341, in packet (asap).

Week 2. September 1. Electoral Control David Mayhew,

*Congress: The Electoral Connection* (in packet)

R. Douglas Arnold, *The Logic of Congressional Action* (1990), pp. 1-87.(in packet)

Barry Weingast, “A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms,” *AJPS* (1979) (in packet)

Robert E. Hogan, “Policy Responsiveness and Incumbent Reelection in State Legislatures,” (October '08) (in packet) (*AJPS* , p 858-873) Published Online: Sep 29 2008 10:08AM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00347.x

Week 3. September 8 Distributive Politics I.

R. Douglas Arnold, *Congress and the Bureaucracy* (1979), pp. 3-91.

Report on Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina, *The Personal Vote* (1987).

Kenneth Shepsle, Robert P. Van Houweling, Samuel J. Abrams, Peter C. Hanson, “The Senate Electoral Cycle and Bicameral Appropriations Politics (*AJPS*, p 343-359) Published Online: Mar 27, 2009 11:09AM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00374.x

John S. Lapinski, “Policy Substance and Performance in American Lawmaking,” 1877–1994 (*AJPS*, p 235-251). Published Online: Apr 4 2008 12:00AM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00310.x

Elisabeth R. Gerber, Clark C. Gibson, **Balancing Regionalism and Localism: How Institutions and Incentives Shape American Transportation Policy** (*AJPS*, p 633-648) Published Online: Jun 23 2009 10:07AM

Allen Hicken, Joel W. Simmons, "The Personal Vote and the Efficacy of Education Spending" (*AJPS*, p 109-124) Published Online: Jan 18 2008 12:00AM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00302.x

**Week 4. September 15 Distributive Politics 2.**

Diana Evans, *Greasing the Wheels* (200 )

Mona M. Lyne , "Proffering Pork: How Party Leaders Build Party Reputations in Brazil" (*AJPS*, p 290-303). Published Online: Apr 4 2008 12:00AM

Ilyana Kuziemko and Eric Werker, "How Much is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations," *Journal of Political Economy*, 2006, Vol 114 No. 4, pp. 905-930.

Christopher Berry, Bary Burden, and William Howell, "Congress in Theory: Subjecting Canonical Models of Distributive Politics to Basic (but long overdue) Empirical Tests," a paper presented to the 2008 Midwest Political Science Association.

**Week 5. September 22 Party.**

Cox and McCubbins, *Legislative Leviathan* (1993 or Second Edition)

John W Patty, "Equilibrium Party Government" (*AJPS*, p 636-655). Published Online: Jul 9 2008 1:21PM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00334.x

R. Douglas Arnold, *Logic of Congressional Action* (1990), pp. 88-146.

Stephen D. Levitt and James M Snyder, Jr., "The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes," *J of Political Economy*, 1997, Vol 105, No. 1, pp. 30-53.

Sean Gailmard, Jeffery A. Jenkins Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate (*AJPS*, p 324-342) Published Online: Mar 27 2009 11:09AM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00373.x

Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization? (*AJPS*, p 666-680). Published Online: Jun 23 2009 10:07AM

**Week 6 September 29 Institutionalization and Proposal Power**

Report on Champagne, et al, *The Austin Boston Connection* (2009)

Nelson W. Polsby, *How Congress Evolves* (2004)

David Baron and John Ferrejohn, [Bargaining in legislatures](#)

- ► [uibk.ac.at](#) [PDF] - *The American Political Science Review*, 1989 - jstor.org

Week 7. October 6 Keith Krehbiel I and II

Keith Krehbiel, *Information and Legislative Organization*, U Michigan Press, 1991.

David M. Primo, Sarah A. Binder, Forrest Maltzman, "Who Consents? Competing Pivots in Federal Judicial Selection" (AJPS, p 471-489) Published Online: Jul 9 2008 1:21PM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00324.x

K Krehbiel, KA Shepsle, BR Weingast [Why are congressional committees powerful?](#) - *American Political Science Review*, 1987 - jstor.org

Boris Shor,

B. Dan Wood,

Brian Knight, "Estimating the Value of Proposal Power," *Am. Economic Review*, Vol. 95, No. 5, Dec. 2005). Pp 1639-1652

Brian Knight, "Estimating the Value of Proposal Power," *Am. Economic Review*, Vol. 95, No. 5, Dec. 2005). Pp 1639-1652

Week 8. October 13 What Legislatures Do

Kentaro Fukumoto, "How Many Laws Does the Legislature Make? Cross Country Comparison and Cointegrated Time Series of Japan," paper presented at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association

Brett Ashley Leeds, Michaela Mattes, Jeremy S. Vogel, Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments (p 461-476) Published Online: Mar 27 2009 11:09AM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00381.x

Scott Desposato, "Critical Debates: Latin American Legislative Politics," *Latin American Politics and Society*,

Peverill Squire and Keith Hamm, *101 Chambers: Congress, State Legislatures, and the Future of Legislative Studies*, Ohio State, 2005.

Week 9. October 20

**Week 10. October 27**

**Week 11. November 3**

**Week 12. November 10**

**Week 13. November 17**

**Week 14. November 24**

**Week 15. December 1**

#### **Recommended**

**Frank R. Baumgartner, Christian Breunig, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, Bryan D. Jones, Peter B. Mortensen, Michiel Nuytemans, Stefaan Walgrave “Punctuated Equilibrium in Comparative Perspective,” *AJPS* , Volume 53 Issue 3 (July 2009**

**Mark D. Ramirez The Dynamics of Partisan Conflict on Congressional Approval (p 681-694) Published Online: Jun 23 2009 10:07AM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00394.x**

**Seok-ju Cho, Retrospective Voting and Political Representation (p 276-291) Published Online: Mar 27 2009 11:09AM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00370.x**

**Shigeo Hirano, James M. Snyder, Jr. Using Multimember District Elections to Estimate the Sources of the Incumbency Advantage (p 292-306) Published Online: Mar 27 2009 11:09AM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00371.x**

**Matias A. Bargsted, Orit Kedar , Coalition-Targeted Duvergerian Voting: How Expectations Affect Voter Choice under Proportional Representation (p 307-323)**

**Published Online: Mar 27 2009 11:09AM**

**DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00372.x**

**Ray C. Fair, Presidential and Congressional Vote-Share Equations (p 55-72)**

**Published Online: Dec 24 2008 12:21PM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00357.x**

**William B. Heller, Carol Mershon, Dealing in Discipline: Party Switching and Legislative Voting in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988–2000 (p 910-925) Published Online: Sep 29 2008 10:08AM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00350.x**

**Jessica Trounstine, Melody E. Valdini, The Context Matters: The Effects of Single-Member versus At-Large Districts on City Council Diversity (p 554-569) Published Online: Jul 9 2008 1:21PM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00329.x**

**John Duffy, Margit Tavits, Beliefs and Voting Decisions: A Test of the Pivotal Voter Model (p 603-618) Published Online: Jul 9 2008 1:21PM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00332.x**

**Laura Stoker, M. Kent Jennings, Of Time and the Development of Partisan Polarization (p 619-635) Published Online: Jul 9 2008 1:21PM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00333.x**

**Forrest Maltzman, Charles R. Shipan , Change, Continuity, and the Evolution of the Law (p 252-267), Published Online: Apr 4 2008 12:00AM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00311.x**

**Miriam A. Golden, Lucio Picci, Pork-Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953–94 (p 268-289) Published Online: Apr 4 2008 12:00AM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00312.x**

**Joseph Wright, Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment (p 322-343) Published Online: Apr 4 2008 12:00AM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00315.x**

**James G. Gimpel, Frances E. Lee, Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz, The Check Is in the Mail: Interdistrict Funding Flows in Congressional Elections (p 373-394) Published Online: Apr 4 2008 12:00AM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00318.x**

**Kenneth Mori McElwain , Manipulating Electoral Rules to Manufacture Single-Party Dominance (p 32-47) Published Online: Jan 18 2008 12:00AM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00297.x**

**Frederick Solt ,Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement (p 48-60) Published Online: Jan 18 2008 12:00AM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00298.x**

**Suzanna De Boef, Luke Keele, Taking Time Seriously (p 184-200) Published Online: Jan 18 2008 12:00AM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00307.x**

**Ernesto Dal Bó, Bribing Voters (p 789-803) Published Online: Oct 2 2007 12:00AM**

**Matthew J. Lebo, Adam J. McGlynn, Gregory Koger, Strategic Party Government: Party Influence in Congress, 1789–2000 (p 464-481) Published Online: Jun 19 2007 12:00AM**

**John M. Carey, Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting (p 92-107) Published Online: Jan 4 2007 12:00AM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00239.x**

**Gary W. Cox, Jonathan N. Katz , Gerrymandering Roll Calls in Congress, 1879–2000 (p 108-119) Published Online: Jan 4 2007 12:00AM DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00240.x**

**Scott E. Robinson, Floun'say Caver, Kenneth J. Meier, Laurence J. O'Toole Jr, Explaining Policy Punctuations: Bureaucratization and Budget Change (p 140-150) Published Online: Jan 4 2007 12:00AM**

**DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00242.x**

NEW: Retail buying power is ignored in communities of color until white people move in. Read [The Chicago Reporter](#)'s cover investigation in the [September/October issue](#), by Reporter Kelly Virella.