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The New Daley Machine: 1989-2004

by
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Abstract

The epitome of older machine politics occurred under Richard J. Daley and his pro-growth regime in Chicago from 1955-1976. It was characterized by patronage, slate-making, and alliances to the down-town business community. The new machine under Richard M. Daley continues some aspects of the older machine, but patronage precinct captains are supplemented by candidate-based, synthetic campaigns using large sums of money from the global economy to purchase professional political consultants, public opinion polls, paid television ads, and direct mail. On the governing side, the new machine is characterized by a rubber stamp city council and public policies that benefit the new global economy more than the older developer economy. The theories of old machine politics are tested in this paper with data on campaign contributions, city council roll call votes, election results, corruption scandals, and an analysis of the major public decisions since 1989. The rewards for minorities, specifically African Americans and Latinos, under the new Daley machine reveal the racial basis of the regime. The atrophy of the opposition to the new Daley Machine is compared to the reform movements under the old Daley machine. The role of the businesses in the downtown and global economy is explored.

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In this paper, we compare the political regimes that dominated Chicago since World War II. These have been known as the "Chicago Machine" and in the more sophisticated social science literature sometimes as the "Chicago Growth Machine." The epitome of older machine politics occurred under Richard J. Daley and his pro-growth regime in Chicago from 1955-1976. It was characterized by patronage, slate-making, and alliances to the down-town business community. This paper compares this machine to the new political and governmental regime under Mayor Richard J. Daley's son, Richard M. Daley who has ruled Chicago as mayor since 1989.

Specifically, we explore the interaction between the mayor and the elected members of the Chicago City Council. The voting patterns of city councils are a central indication of urban politics. We also explore the funding of mayoral campaign as a way of determining empirically some aspects of the governing regime of the city. Finally, we study election results, corruption scandals, minority jobs and contracts, and policy decisions as a further window into the political and governmental dynamics of the city.

Council Wars

In comparing campaign contributions for Harold Washington's first election for mayor in 1983, his reelection in 1987, and Daley's election in 1999, we found that the patterns of contributions in these three elections differ dramatically.

When Harold Washington began his run for mayor in 1982, his financial support initially came from a handful of affluent benefactors. His support came from interests quite unlike those of the downtown business associations supportive of the late Mayor Richard J. Daley's regime. Washington received $54,000 in donations from Johnson Publishing, a Chicago-based firm producing magazines targeting African-American readership. He received multiple loans, co-signed by a group of political supporters including his campaign treasurer Odell Hicks and Washington's successor to the U.S. House of Representatives, Charles Hayes.

By the time the post-election financial disclosures were filed, Washington's campaign reported receiving more than $4 million in contributions and loans from January-June, 1983. Washington's largest benefactors included the $54,000 from Johnson Publishing, more than $20,000 from a firm called the Stellar Group, and nearly $10,000 from Soft Sheen, which manufactures African American cosmetic products. Unlike the late Mayor Daley's regime, Mayor Washington's business supporters had deep roots in the African American community.

Upon re-election, Mayor Washington's financial base of support changed noticeably (see Figure 1 below). By the 1987 primary, the construction industry became a much more important source of campaign revenue. It accounted for more than 5% of his $5 million campaign bank account in that reporting cycle. By comparison, construction firms and trade unions had provided Washington's campaign with less than 1% of his contributions in 1983.

Figure 1:
Campaign Contributions to Harold Washington's 1987 Campaign



Lawyers, who contributed less than 1.5% in 1983, gave Washington 7.6% of his financial support in 1987. Meanwhile, the party organizations and government officials who had been his single largest source of revenue in 1983 had dropped to third on the list, at 1.9%. The financial services, which had been more than 10% in 1983 decreased to slightly more than 8% of Washington's 1987 revenue. The balance of his campaign funds came from individuals and political action committees.

During his first term, Mayor Washington presided over a bitterly divided City Council. The bitter political debates of the "Council Wars" of the time has been mapped elsewhere (Grimshaw 1992 and Simpson 2001). The divided Washington council was dominated by two large factions – with twenty-one aldermen supporting the mayor and a majority of twenty-nine aldermen in opposition.

Figure 2:
Aldermanic Agreement with Floor Leader for 111 Divided Roll Call Votes in the Chicago City Council, January-December 1985, Harold Washington, Mayor.



As Figure 3 demonstrates, by the time of Washington's second election, his support in the council changed. As we demonstrated, his financial support coalition also evolved. In Mayor Washington's first term, the 1985 council was clearly divided into two competing factions. In this time period, only 15 aldermen voted with Mayor Washington on 90% of the divided roll-call votes. By 1987, the divisions are not as marked. By then, the number of aldermen supporting him on more than 90% of the roll-call votes reaches 31, more than half of the council. By 1987, only 6 aldermen persistently voted against Mayor Washington's more than half the time in divided votes.

Figure 3:
Aldermanic Agreement with Floor Leader for 32 Divided Roll Call Votes in the Chicago City Council, April 15-September 30, 1987, Harold Washington, Mayor



Not long after the start of his second term, however, Chicago's first African American mayor suffered a fatal heart attack, splintering his support coalition, just as the late-Mayor Daley's support network had fractured earlier.

Richard M. Daley Regime

The divisiveness within Washington's former governing coalition precipitated Richard M. Daley's ascension to the Chicago mayoralty. The late mayor's son enjoyed financial support from some of the same basic interests as his father.

Figure 4:
Campaign Contributions to Richard M. Daley's 1999 Campaign



Construction interests immediately came to support the younger Mayor Daley. By 1999, the construction industry produced nearly 17% of Daley's total revenue. Daley's strength in raising money in the construction industry included the support he receives from the construction trade unions. The Brotherhood of Carpenters PAC gave Daley $56,000, while various local unions supplied additional support. The plumbing industry and associated unions gave in excess of $65,000. A developers' PAC, by contrast, gave only $5,000. However, many individual construction firms gave Daley up to $10,000 each. In Illinois, business corporations can give campaign contributions directly and do not have to use PACs.

The financial service industry contributed roughly 10% of Daley's income and the legal community produced 5.5% of his revenue in 1999. The tourism and hospitality industry, whose support for Washington was anemic, was quite helpful to Daley. Roughly 4% of his revenue came in this sector, including a $10,000 gift from the owner of the Chicago Blackhawks hockey team, and another $ 10,000 from a livery firm from Frankfort, Illinois. The union representing hotel employees also gave Daley's campaign $30,000. Government officials produced only 1.6% of Daley's financial support, less than they had given in Washington's final race for office.

Mayor Richard M. Daley did not endure the same hostilities with the City Council with which Mayor Washington had to cope. During his first year in office from 1989-1990, 28 members of council supported Mayor Daley's initiatives in more than 90% of the divided roll-call votes cast. Only 13 aldermen voted in opposition to Mayor Daley in more than half of the divided roll-call City Council votes, about half the number doing so during the first Washington administration. By the 1993-94 Council sessions, all aldermen supported Daley more often than not in divided votes, and 30 supported him more than 90% of the time, when the Council was divided. The other 20 aldermen supported him from 50-89% of the time. Clearly

from the earliest days, Mayor Richard M. Daley enjoyed higher levels of support in the Chicago City Council than Mayor Washington enjoyed at the peak of his power.

Solidification of the New Daley Machine

In the 21st Century, the New Daley Machine has solidified in three ways. First, the Chicago City Council has become even more of a rubber stamp than in Richard M. Daley's first terms in office. Second, Mayor Daley's campaign contributions continue to reveal the development a new dominant regime governing the city. This regime is composed of traditional regime members of developers, city contractors, construction unions, and real estate firms, as well as newcomers including major contributors from the new global economic sectors of the economy including banks, lawyers, and international manufacturing firms. Third, in a trend continuing since the 1970s, more convention, tourism, and major public works projects have been taken out of the usual political process and turned over to the private sector and special independent quasi-governmental agencies appointed by the mayor and the governor. Taken together, these trends have meant a lessening of democracy and the centralizing of power in a new machine, which while continuing the old machine perfected under Mayor Richard J. Daley, differs in a number of specific ways. There is also some evidence that aspects of this "New Machine" are beginning to appear in other major American cities.

A. Return of the Rubber Stamp City Council

The rubber stamp city council appeared in the late 1930s and early 1940s under Mayor Ed Kelly and became the norm under Richard J. Daley (1955-1976). It continued under Mayors Michael Bilandic and Jane Byrne (1977-1983). The pattern was interrupted by the "Council Wars" under Mayor Harold Washington (1983-1987) and by the fragmented council under Mayor Eugene Sawyer (1987-1989).

Figure 5
Aldermanic Agreement with Floor Leader for 13 Divided Roll Call Votes in the Chicago City Council, January 12, 2000 to June 6, 2001; Mayor Richard M Daley.



The Richard M. Daley councils have continued to become more of a rubber stamp. In the 18 months during Daley's last term, from January 12, 2000 to June 6, 2001, there were only 13 divided roll call votes, less than one a month. 32 aldermen supported the mayor from 90-100% of the time and another 14 gave the mayor 80-89% support. The mean and median level of support for the mayor on even divided roll call votes was an amazing 90%. And no alderman gave the mayor less than 60 percent support. This Is In sharp contrast with the era of Richard J. Daley during which a core of reform and minority alderman regularly opposed the mayor (See Simpson, 2001, Chapter4). Clearly more of a rubber stamp has evolved, giving the mayor virtually a blank check on all policies, including some that were controversial such as the renovation of Soldier Field.

The rubber stamp city council has become steadily more docile over the past decade and even more so since there have been only ten divided roll call votes in the city council. Most of them have not affected significant issues of local governance in Chicago. One divided issue in which there was major controversy was a resolution opposing the federal USA PATRIOT Act, which a majority of aldermen believe undermine civil liberties. The PATRIOT Act vote was significant in that it was Daley's first defeat on a roll call vote in his 15 years as mayor, but of more importance to local governance is the continued unanimous adoption of Daley's city budgets, including the budget for 2004. Seven of the divided roll calls were a series of lopsided 49-1 and 48-2 votes on matters such as city property sales on Chicago's South Side. Only two of the divided roll call votes in the last year had any real significance to governance of the city itself. They were a vote of 32-15 to approve the zoning necessary for a new Wal-Mart in the Austin neighborhood but defeated the zoning for a Wal-Mart, Office Depot, and Lowe's Home

Improvement Center on the Southside when the issue gained only 25 and not the required 26 vote absolute majority needed for zoning changes. On both these issues, the mayor did not pressure the aldermen and they were left to decide on their own. Thus, in general, the Chicago City Council remains a rubber stamp, but it is slowly showing some signs of life.

Most often in the council, such opposition as exists takes the form of opposition on specific issues, or the threat of opposition, to push the Daley administration. Alderman are not generally willing to oppose the mayor outright – after all, he appointed 19 of them to fill vacancies and many others are firmly controlled by the powerful ward committeemen who slated them. But in several cases, aldermen have succeeded in influencing the administration to support policies it previously opposed and some aldermen are more willing to push Daley than previously. For example, Alderman Toni Preckwinkle (4th Ward) introduced her own legislation to force developers to set aside affordable housing in larger developments. While her ordinance did not pass as introduced, the Daley administration adopted a watered down version and developed a partial affordable housing program in response. Meanwhile, a Daley appointee, Ald. Tom Tunney (44th Ward), was able to force the administration to put $1 million more in AIDS prevention funding by threatening a floor fight on the 2004 budget. Nonetheless, Daley has one of the strongest rubber stamp councils in Chicago's political history. The council under the younger Mayor Daley today lacks even the core of consistent opposition that existed on the council under his father.

Meanwhile, across City Hall on the Cook County side of the building, a full scale revolt led by maverick Democrats and Republicans is underway in opposition to Daley ally, County Board President John Stroger. Among the issues on which the County Board President has been defeated have been the administration of the Forest Preserve District, the county budget of 2004, and the demolition of the old Cook County Hospital. This is totally out of character for the formerly docile county board, which had only nominal Republican Party minority opposition for decades.

For now, Daley dominates a subservient rubber stamp city council, but the subterranean stirring of the council, the occasional Independent vote, and the out right revolt in the county board demonstrate, this may not continue permanently as the stress of governing the city in a recession economy and the growing Latino population begins to place pressure on the white-dominated Daley machine.

B. The Money Machine

The old Richard J. Daley machine got its money from three major sources, private sector businesses which benefited from city contracts and policies; labor unions; and contributions from party workers – frequently in terms of a special tax they "voluntarily" paid on their city salaries. The new Daley machine continues to receive contributions from the traditional private sector contributors – almost one third of Mayor Richard M. Daley's $3.6 million campaign contributions in 2003 came from these sectors. But the new machine has added a major new source of funding. An additional third of the 2003 total came from the businesses of the global economy – financial services, securities traders, corporate law firms, bankers, and international manufacturers.

Some of the largest traditional machine supporters that funded Mayor Daley's nearly uncontested re-election include property developers Richard Hoffman Corp. ($10,250); contractor Patrick Nash, president of Nash Brothers, Inc. ($12,500); and the Building Owners and Managers Association PAC ($15,000). Construction unions also heavily supported Daley, including his largest single contributor, the Chicago and Northeast Illinois Council of Carpenters

($62,851), and two plumbing unions that combined for $30,000. Altogether, this traditional machine sector contributed some $1.1 million to the Daley 2003 campaign.

It is in the global economic sector of lawyers, bankers, financiers and international manufacturers where Daley's current fundraising departs most dramatically from that of his father. He saw lavish donations from, for example, law firm Schirott & Luetkehans ($10,000); attorney Jules Laser ($10,000); the Chicago Mercantile Exchange ($25,000); and commodities traders Richard Dennis ($15,000) and Blair Hull, future U.S. Senate candidate ($28,250). All told, the financial and legal sectors contributed almost $1 million to the Daley campaign.

Figure 6:
2003 Daley campaign donations by sector



Daley also saw significant contributions from two other sectors – tourism and conventions and international manufacturing. In the tourism and conventions sector, Daley received $25,000 from the Service Employees International Union, which represents many Chicago hotel workers; several hotel owners contributed $5,000 each; and several restaurant owners, including Sam Sianis, the owner of the Chicago Cubs-famed Billy Goat Tavern in Wrigleyville, also donated $5,000 apiece. In the manufacturing sector, Daley received $5,000 from firms like Kraft Foods and $5,500 from steel finishing firm, A. Finkl & Sons.

The global economic sector, Chicago's "new economy," which has come to play such a significant role in funding the mayor's campaigns, wants to promote policies that make Chicago a more "global" city. Such a city has to be attractive to the highly paid employees of global financial and legal services firms, business travelers, and tourists and convention-goers from around the world. The expansion of McCormick Place; the rehabilitation of Navy Pier; the long-awaited opening of Millennium Park; the reconstruction of Soldier Field; the continuation of cultural amenities like the Museum Campus, the Chicago Symphony, Lyric Opera, and art galleries; flower planters and trees along boulevards; and the razing of ugly public housing projects – all of which have occurred under Mayor Daley's regime – fit the needs and desires of his global economic contributors.

Of course, his more traditional contributors – construction firms, city contractors,

construction unions, and real estate firms – who have contributed to both his and his father's campaigns since the 1950s are also in favor of big projects such as McCormick Place expansion, Soldier Field, and Millennium Park as well as the fostering of downtown upscale residential developments which greatly increase the value of property and the rents which landlords can charge.

C. Corruption

The corruption scandals during the reign of Richard M Daley reveal the negative aspect of the private/public partners who govern Chicago. Most of these scandals involve pin-stripped patronage and insider deals in enriching city contracts and franchises. Some of the more prominent scandals over the last 15 Daley years are:

1) The Duff family janitorial contracts in which the family contributed heavily to Daley's election campaigns and illegally reaped large contracts.
2) Airport franchise scandals in which friends and political allies of the mayor acted as lobbyists and brokers to obtain franchises for various concessions.
3) Daley's own alderman, 11th Ward Alderman Pat Huels was forced to resign from the city council for taking a business loan from a trucking company headed by a family friend of Mayor Daley and the alderman.
4) Fraudulent private trucking firm contracts for trucks not needed by the city.
5) The head of McCormick Place - Navy Pier Authority engaged in fraudulent campaign fund raising for former Republican Governor George Ryan.

A complete list of scandals in the Richard M. Daley administration would require a separate paper, if not an entire book, but the general pattern is clear – family friends, campaign contributors, and political insiders have the inside track in obtaining very lucrative city contracts and franchises. This is in spite of various criminal convictions and attempts to reform the purchasing process.

Corruption is not limited to the executive branch and to Daley campaign contributors. It also continues unabated in the city council. Since 1971, 26 aldermen (out of more than 120 who have served in the 50 member council in this forty year period) have been convicted and sent to jail for corruption. Although not convicted, the mayor's political floor leader, 11th Ward Alderman Pat Huels was force to resign because of conflicts of interest. Other aldermen have been exposed by the media as having conflicts of interests and benefiting themselves at the expense of the public they are supposed to represent. (Banquet, Lipinski, and Gaines, 1987)

Thus, the old fashioned corruption that has characterized the various forms of machine politics in Chicago for 150 years continues. While these scandals damage Chicago's national and international image, they do not affect tourism, conventions, or the global service and manufacturing economy. Therefore, the global economy sector, which has become a part of Chicago's governing regime, is willing to tolerate these excesses. The Arthur Andersen corporate scandals suggest that even greater levels of corruption may exist in the global sector of the economy itself.

D. Rewards for Minorities

The new Daley machine has, for the most part, reversed the ethnic/racial alliances and rewards of his father's and Mayor Washington's regimes. Richard J. Daley's machine was based upon White Ethnic and African American support base opposing Republican and progressive white wards that were mostly middle-class. Harold Washington was elected with overwhelming support from the African American community, along with strong support from Latinos and

progressive Whites. Both mayors rewarded their political supporters with jobs and contracts accordingly.

By contrast, Richard M. Daley was elected with overwhelming support from the White and Latino communities and almost no votes from the Black community. Mayor Daley could not eliminate the gains that Blacks had made in jobs and contracts under Harold Washington. In fact, his administration revised executive orders and ordinances to set aside jobs and contracts for minorities passed under Mayor Washington to make these policies permanent and to help them withstand court challenges.

However, the increases in African-American electoral support for Mayor Daley over the years and increased support for his administration's proposals by Black aldermen in the city council have brought less rather than more rewards. At the same time, Daley has greatly increased the reward to the Latino community – more aldermanic seats in the council, more jobs at city hall and more contracts (Adeoye 2003).

Figure 7: Black Voters' Mayoral Support, City of Chicago.



Sources: Municipal Reference Section, Harold Washington Library, Chicago; Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Report (EEO-4) for the City of Chicago, 1980-1999; City of Chicago Purchasing Department.

Despite their roughly 36% of the population, an average of 34% of city council membership, and an increasing level of electoral support of Mayor Richard M. Daley (from 12% support in 1989 to 59% in 2003), blacks have received cuts in city contracts from of an average high of about 12% to an average low of about 10%. White there has been an increase of 47 points in African American electoral support and support by black aldermen in the council, black jobs have dropped slightly from 33.25% in 1989 to 32.5% in 1999-2000.

Latino electoral support for mayors has fluctuated, although it has remained very high for Mayor Richard M. Daley. Rewards for Latino support began under Mayor Washington. Latinos

received for the first time about 4% of the contracts and 5% of the city jobs in 1987. When Daley became mayor with their electoral support in 1989, they got 7% of the contracts and 6% of the jobs. By 2000, Latinos had increased to 14% of the contracts and 11% of the jobs. In short, Latinos under Mayor Richard M. Daley have steadily increased their share of city jobs and contracts while blacks have not.

Figure 8: Latino Voters' Support and Rewards



Sources: Municipal Reference Section, Harold Washington Library, Chicago; Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Report (EEO-4) for the City of Chicago, 1980-1999; City of Chicago Purchasing Department.

Thus, the New Daley Machine is based primarily on support from Whites and Latinos who receive the appropriate political rewards for their support. Whites are still dominant and receive the bulk of the rewards while Latinos receive an ever increasing share. While Blacks have not been punished for their early lack of support, they have not been a key part of the governing regime. They receive sufficient rewards to prevent a rebellion but giving more electoral votes and city council support to Mayor Daley has not resulted in a bigger share of the pie.

E. The Policy Machine

The old fashioned political machine rules the precincts and the city council. Decisions about city contracts and routine city services still occur at this level. The global economic sector through its money has become a part of the governing regime through its campaign contributions, the prestige which the choice by a global company like Boeing makes in selecting Chicago as its international corporate headquarters, and the money the global economy brings to Chicago through the banks, commodities and stock market trades, and its law, accounting, and

consulting businesses. We have already discussed some of the policy decisions by the Daley administration that have been supported and encouraged by this sector of the economy.

However, another aspect of the New Daley Machine has been the separate policy arenas which have emerged outside traditional mayoral and city council decision making which is usually thought to provide for representative democracy even in a machine controlled city. Machine democracy may not be as high a form of democracy as most theories of representative democracy call for, but it is better than despotism or anarchy.

Economic and political trends since the reign of Richard J. Daley have accelerated during the reign of Richard M. Daley. One of these is the turning over of major "public" decisions either entirely to the private sector (with only the most limited governmental supervision) or to quasi-independent governmental agencies appointed by the mayor and the governor (Judd and Simpson, 2003).

After the recession of 1991-1992, Chicago, like many American cities, began to revive its fortunes on the basis of a corporate-centered downtown renovation and an expanded global service economy. It became the Midwest capital of the global economy. For instance, in the 1990s, Chicago experienced very rapid growth in tourism and conventions. In 1998, there were 4,530,000 visits to the city and Chicago that year ranked first in conventions in the country. (Clark, Lloyd, Wong, and Jain, 18). Chicago continues to lead the world in square feet of convention space, while suburban Rosemont ranks 10th in the country, providing additional convention space for the metropolitan region.

The importance of these visitors has been evident in tax collections. Chicago's hotel operator's tax grew from $12.2 million in 1998 to $14.1 million in 2000. An additional $37 million in hotel taxes on hotel bills was raised in 2001. Similarly the city's sales tax revenue grew from $54 million in 1989, when Richard M. Daley first was elected mayor, to $145 million in 1999 (Judd and Simpson, 1058). An estimated $8 billion flowed into Chicago's economy annually from convention and tourism expenditures before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Lowe, 2002).

For the most part, the decisions that bring tourists and conventions to Chicago occur outside of city hall. There are the decisions of the private sector corporations to build the fancy stores and hotels on the "Magnificent Mile" on North Michigan Avenue. Museums and cultural institutions like the Art Institute make decisions through their own board of directors although they receive public subsidies through the Park District. But many key decisions about sports stadium, convention centers, and Navy Pier are made by quasi-public, independent governmental agencies. For instance, a board appointed by the mayor of Chicago and the governor of Illinois governs the sprawling McCormick Place convention center and the renovated Navy Pier entertainment complex in Chicago. The state designates $98 million annually, mainly from the cigarette tax, to pay off previous bonds for construction and remodeling. Under Illinois law, "the metropolitan pier and exposition authority is authorized to borrow money and issue bonds" under the faith and credit of the state of Illinois to be paid off using the state's cigarette tax (Judd and Simpson, 1062). Not only has the State of Illinois paid for the standard convention center and entertainment complex, but the Pier and Exposition Authority also floated a $108 million tax-exempt bond issue to build and own the Hyatt Regency McCormick Place Hotel (Fulton, 2002).

These independent quasi-public authorities legally operate independently from but often interact closely with Mayor Daley's administration. Sometimes controversy can erupt over major expansions financed by public bond funds. The latest example in Chicago was the public funding of Soldier Field, the stadium that houses the Chicago Bears football team and now the Chicago Fire professional soccer team. This became controversial in 2001 and 2002 over the design of the stadium and the issue of naming rights that might have given the stadium a corporate name rather than its current name honoring the soldiers who fought in previous wars.

In 2001 the Chicago City Council, after a major debate, approved the city's share of funding for the Soldier Field renovation by a divided vote of 43-7 (Simpson, 2001, 131-132). It was one of only16 divided roll call votes between 2000 and 2002. The Chicago Tribune published several highly critical articles and twice editorialized against the proposed plan and highly publicized lawsuits, which eventually failed, were filed against it as well. Nonetheless, Mayor Daley was able to push through his agreements with Bears and the Park District in spite of public doubts and minority opposition in the council.

Most tourist, convention, and major development decisions are made behind closed doors with little public input. On the one hand, general-purpose city government is devolving political authority and fiscal resources entirely to the private sector or to independent quasi-public authorities. On the other hand, Mayor Daley's appointment power over these boards and the need for city approval of bonds in the complicated development deals have strengthened the power of the mayor while relegating the city council to even more of a rubber stamp than usual and leaving the public – even when represented by powerful news media like the Chicago Tribune — out of the decision-making loop. While in some cities like St. Louis, the separate agencies have further fragmented government authority; in Chicago they have strengthened the new Daley Machine (Judd and Simpson, 1067).

F. The Political Machine in the Precincts

The 2004 primary elections once again revealed a distinctive change in the old "Daley Machine" of Richard J. Daley. It differs substantially from the "New Daley Machine" under Richard M. Daley. In local elections, the machine of Richard M. Daley functions as successfully as that of his father did, normally crushing poorly organized opposition. In the 2003 aldermanic elections, all but five incumbents were re-elected, most by landslide totals, and those that lost, such as Vilma Colon in the 35th Ward, saw at best tepid machine support in the face of strong community opposition. The ward committeemen elections were mostly uncontested romps. For instance, in the 47th Ward Ed Kelly had been narrowly reelected ward committeeman four years ago. Then the old 47th ward machine's aldermanic candidate was trounced by the incumbent Alderman Eugene Schulter's machine in last year's aldermanic election. In the 2004 election, Alderman Schulter won the post of ward committeeman with no opponent on the ballot and the factions of the machine were reunited.

Elections for higher offices are distinctly different from the elections during Daley's father's reign. Richard M. Daley does not hold the chairmanship of the Central Committee of the Democratic Party of Cook County as his father did. More colloquially, he ain't the "boss." Rather, he is selective about where he deploys his troops. And in this year's U. S. Senate primary election, he sat conspicuously on the sidelines.

State Comptroller Dan Hynes, the son of long-time party ward boss and former Cook County Assessor Thomas Hynes, got only 15 percent of the votes cast in the city despite the backing of many Democratic ward committeemen. Hynes carried only four of the city's 50 wards, including a bare majority of 51 percent in his father's 19th ward. The mayor stayed neutral and his troops stayed home, opening the way for independent Democratic and community activist State Senator Barack Obama to crush the party regulars. As the reporters at the Chicago Tribune opined, "while Daley has great power to bring ward bosses into line behind candidates of his choosing, he is far pickier than his father in choosing which election battles he will fight" (Washburn, Meyer, and Mihalopoulos). Instead, Mayor Daley sends out his "volunteers" – who are also city hall employees – much less often, and the Shakman Decree, which outlaws patronage hiring and firing, has sharply reduced the number of city employees who double as precinct captains.

The Tribune concluded that "With the polls showing growing support for Barack Obama, there was little politically for the mayor to gain by backing Hynes, despite long-standing ties to his father" (Washburn, Meyer, and Mihalopoulos, 2) Long time party boss Ed Kelly interviewed for the news story said, " I think they were just overpowered. You don't have the organizations working like they used to...There is no discipline in the party. I don't mean threatening people. I mean getting people together, sitting down and trying to motivate them [on behalf of a party candidate]" (Washburn, Meyer, and Mihalopoulos, 2).

David Axelrod, the Daley political consultant who was hired by Obama as his chief strategist, framed it slightly differently, indicating that no machine could blunt voter enthusiasm for his candidate. "I think there was a tsunami out there for Barack Obama across the state and in the city of Chicago that completely overwhelmed any organization," he said. "I think people came out on their own because they wanted to vote for this attractive candidate they liked. And there was no organization that was going to stop them from doing it. If you're running for judge or you're running for sanitary district commissioner or any number of other down-ballot offices, having the Democratic organization's support is helpful. It is less consequential in a race in which there is a ton of information available to voters and they're getting a lot of recommendations from other sources " (Washburn, Meyer, and Mihalopoulos, 2). However strong Richard M. Daley's machine may be, this limitation in high profile races makes for a sharp contrast with the machine of his father, which could effectively control elections at all levels of the ballot. Richard J. Daley was correctly perceived as the "king maker" behind even presidential elections like John F. Kennedy's.

There is no doubt that today's machine at the precinct and ward level is weaker. But as the saying goes, "In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king." When there are no counter political forces such as money and paid political ads for the bigger races or strong Independent political organizations campaigning for more local candidates, even a much weaker machine still rules in Chicago.

Conclusion

Thus, several trends have conspired to consolidate the New Daley Machine. The Chicago City Council has been reduced to its classic rubber stamp role and that pattern has only accentuated the longer the mayor has remained in power. The mayor has won his reelection by ever greater majorities, such that he longer has viable opponents on the ballot. The money machine which finances the mayor's campaigns lets him run campaigns very similar to Presidential campaigns when the need arises. At the same time, the mayor's campaign contributions demonstrate that the local governing regime has been reconstituted to include elements of the global economy. The private sector and the quasi-independent governmental agencies, which determine much of the housing and economic development as well as the tourist and convention amenities of Chicago, are aligned with Mayor Daley. The New Daley Machine is based upon a White/Latino coalition in which Latinos are clearly the junior partners but they are receiving more city jobs and contracts than previously. While Blacks are not key to the regime, they are not being alienated by the racist policies of earlier White city administrations. The Daley political machine in the precincts and wards is weaker. The mayor doesn't endorse and fight all major elections and can't sway elections for higher office so easily. There are fewer patronage city employees to work the precinct. Yet, there is still a machine in Chicago and, of that machine, Daley is still king.

Are these trends that create a New Daley Machine present in other major cities? Timothy Krebs (2002) has shown that the "new economy" associated with globalization, which consists of financial, professional, real estate and development, entertainment and tourism, and media,

figured heavily in campaign contributions to Mayor James Hahn and city council candidates in the 2001 Los Angeles election. In that campaign, corporations and individuals representing the new economy accounted for 68% of all itemized contributions to Mayor Hahn, compared to only 17% from the "old economy" (Krebs, 4). Mayor Michael Bloomberg of New York City was able to finance his own mayoral campaign with money from his global media empire.

We do not yet have enough evidence from other cities to know if all elements of the New Daley Machine are appearing as the new urban governing paradigm of the 21st century, but this should be further investigated using similar methodologies in all large cities.

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